PEER EFFECT IN BANK FINANCIAL REPORTING: EVIDENCE FROM LOAN LOSS PROVISION by LI YUEHUA
PEER EFFECT IN BANK FINANCIAL
REPORTING: EVIDENCE FROM LOAN LOSS
PROVISION
LI YUEHUA
Bachelor of Economics, Sun Yat-sen University
Master of Economics, Xiamen University
A THESIS SUBMITTED
FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
DEPARTMENT OF ACCOUNTING
NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF SINGAPORE
2017
DECLARATION
I hereby declare that this thesis is my original work and it has been
written by me in its entirety. I have duly acknowledged all the
sources of information which have been used in the thesis.






I would like to thank my thesis advisory committee member, Professor
Charles Shi, Professor Srinivasan Sankaraguruswamy, and Dr. Seo
Hojun. Their guidance and insights are tremendously valuable for
me to finish the thesis. I would especially express my gratitude
to Professor Charles Shi, for his help and encouragement during
my Ph.D. study. He is an excellent mentor: patient, inspiring, yet
rigorous.
I also want to thank all the professors in Accounting department.
They have been always kind, friendly, and active in research. I
benefited a lot from the research environment built by the faculty.
I also want to thank my friends, for their company and encouragement.
Foremost, I want to thank my family. I want to thank my wife, Pei
Sha, for her love and support. She is always there when I feel down
and blue. I want to thank her for carrying our first child. I would




I find a positive peer e ect exists among U.S. public Bank Holding
Companies’ loan loss provisions. Peer e ect is economically and
statistically significant. Peer e ect improves the timeliness of bank
loan loss recognition as the association between loan loss provision
and future non-performing loan increases. Banks with lower ability
are more inclined to incorporate peer actions in their loan loss
estimation. Overall, observational learning seems to drive the peer
e ect in bank loan loss recognition. However, I also find evidences
that suggest banks may mimic others due to regulatory scrutiny
and performance pressure. The existence of peer e ect in bank loan
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Peer E ect in Bank Financial Reporting:
Evidence from Loan Loss Provision
1 Introduction
Bank regulators require banks do not act alone in loan loss estimation and
in assessing the appropriateness of the allowances. FFIEC (2005) state that
banks should use ratio analysis compared to peer group to analyse the overall
reasonableness of the allowances. It is also an industry common practice to
incorporate industry peer level of loan loss provision in their own recognition.
For example, in Wells Fargo’s annual report, they state that the estimate of
credit losses include some subjective factors like “industry trends”. Regulators’
requirement and industry practice suggest that bank’s recognition of loan loss
provision is influenced by each other. In this paper, I examine whether the
peer e ect exists and how it a ects the timeliness of loan loss recognition and
potentially bank stability.
Banks may put weight on peer actions and adjust their own loss estimation
for several reasons. First of all, the rational behind regulators’ requirement
and industry practice is that collective actions of peer banks provide an aggregated
prediction of future economic performance. Khan and Ozel (2016) find that
loan portfolio quality and provisions indeed contain information that can
help forecast future state level economic conditions. If on average peers are
increasing provisions, it provides some indication that peers are pessimistic
about future economy. Incorporating peer actions instead of relying only on
private information thus potentially improve the reasonableness of allowances
and provisions. In other words, banks may try to improve loan loss estimation
through observational learning as peer actions provide the wisdom of the
crowd.1
Alternatively, banks may mimic their peers due to regulatory scrutiny
1The term “observational learning” is in contrast to peer e ect that are due to direct
social ties, for example, shared auditors, board interlocks.
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or performance pressure. Banks face regulatory questioning to justify their
allowance level. Abnormally over-reserving or under-reserving attracts regulatory
attention and leads to costly examination. Banks have incentives to avoid
being perceived as under-reserved. Bank regulators have a strong incentive to
scrutinize banks for under-reserving as allowances for loan losses and leases
provides an important cushion to absorb future losses from loan defaults.
Inadequate allowances reduce bank stability as it reduces a bank’s ability to
sustain capital level and solvency in recessions. As a monitoring tool, regulators
compare a bank’s allowances or provisions to its peers in order to identify
irregular recognitions of loan losses. For example, the Federal Reserve assesses
a bank’s financial condition and performance based on “its relative percentile
ranks relative to its peers” (FED, 2013; FFIEC, 2005). For public banks,
over-reserving can be considered as a red-flag of earnings management and
attract attention from SEC.2 One example is the SEC investigation of SunTrust
Bank in the 1998. SEC accused SunTrust Bank to be overstating allowances
and initialized a highly publicized investigation. The investigation subsequently
led to a large reduction of allowances for $100 million (Beck and Narayanamoorthy,
2013).
Bank managers’ labor market concern lead to another reason to micmic.
Market infers a bank’s performance by comparing with its peers (Rajan, 1994;
Scharfstein and Stein, 1990). Under the current accounting rule and bank
regulation, recognizing loan loss provision will reduce bank regulatory capital
and reported earnings. This creates incentive to manipulate earnings or regulatory
capital through provisions in order to compete with their peers. For example,
if peers are decreasing provisions, a bank has low incentive to maintain a
relatively high provision as it may reduce the attractiveness of their earnings
number and regulatory capital. On the other hand, continuously maintaining
a low level of provision is not a viable strategy as investors will be suspicious
2In this paper, I mainly focus on public banks as the identification strategy requires stock
return performance.
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of earnings management behaviors and discount the reported earnings. This is
possible as Dichev et al. (2013) report that CEOs consider significant deviation
from industry norm and peer experience as an important red flag of earnings
management. Thus, a bank may also have pressure to increase their provisions
as their peers do, even though the incentive of increasing provisions is weaker
compared with the incentive of decreasing provisions.
Either observational learning or the reputation concern predicts that a
bank’s loan loss recognition is a ected by their peers. However, they have
opposite prediction with respect to the e ect on the timeliness of loan loss
recognition. The observational learning channel suggests that a bank e ciently
use all available information and thus potentially improves the timeliness of
loan loss recognition. On contrary, the reputation concern channel predicts
that useful private information may be intentionally ignored, and consequently,
the timeliness of loan loss recognition deteriorates. Thus it is interesting to
distinguish which channel plays a larger role and whether the net e ect of peer
influence improves or reduces timeliness of loan loss recognition.
While in theory banks are likely to be influenced by their peers in recognizing
loan loss provisions, the magnitude of the peer e ect is unclear. In this paper,
I first try to examine the existence and economic magnitude of peer e ect in
bank loan loss estimation. Identification of peer e ect is challenging (Manski,
1993; Angrist, 2014). The first hurdle is how to define peer groups. In this
paper, I follow the peer group definition used in the Bank Holding Company
Performance Report (BHCPR).3 The bank regulator’s definition of peers is
based on size. It is reasonable to follow the regulators’ definition for several
reasons. Bank regulators expect banks with di erent sizes to adopt di erent
3The Federal Reserve system creates the report as an analytic tool to monitor bank
performance. The report includes a peer average performance report that divides bank into
several peer groups based on consolidated total assets. User’s guide of the report states that
the reports “are designed to assist analysts and examiners in determining a bank holding
company’s financial condition and performance based on financial statements, comparative
ratios, trend analyses, and percentile ranks relative to its peers.” I mainly focus on Bank
Holding Company (BHC) as the financial reporting is ultimately determined by the holding
company.
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loan loss estimation methodologies. For example, FED (2016) states that
the agencies believe “the new accounting standard can be implemented in
a manner appropriate to an institutions’ asset size and complexity”. Banks
with similar size thus face similar stringency of regulatory scrutiny, while the
stringency of regulation di ers across di erent size groups. Banks with similar
size are also more homogeneous with respect to their business model, level of
geography distribution, and risk exposure. In addition, banks with similar size
are also likely to be in each other’s compensation peer group (Bizjak et al.,
2008).
The second challenge is to disentangle the portion of discretionary loan loss
provisions due to peer e ect from the common trend (Manski, 1993; Angrist,
2014). My main regression design is the “linear in mean” model where I regress
a bank’s own loan loss provision on peers’ average loan loss provisions (Manski,
1993). Direct regression is not appropriate as their association can be driven
by unobserved common trends. One approach of identification of peer e ect
requires an exogenous instrument that is directly related to peer’s loan loss
provision but not directly related to a bank’s own provisions. Following Leary
and Roberts (2014), I use peer average idiosyncratic equity return shock as
an instrument of peer banks’ loan loss provision decision. Prior studies find
that discretionary loan loss provision convey private information and is priced
by market (Wahlen, 1994; Beaver and Engel, 1996). Bank managers are thus
likely to adjust their loan loss provisions after experiencing a stock return
shock in order to influence market expectation and pricing. To the extent that
peer idiosyncratic return is orthogonal to the common trend in the banking
industry, peer idiosyncratic return also satisfies the exclusion restriction.
Focusing on public banks, I find evidences consistent with the existence of
peer e ect among banks’ loan loss provision decision. The peer e ect is both
statistically and economically significant. I also use di erent definitions of peer
groups. While the regulators’ definition of peer groups provide a subjective
reference, it only contains four peer groups. Banks within each group may
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still be very di erent. I thus divide banks into 10 equal sized groups based on
the ranking of total assets in each quarter. I also define peers based on their
head-quarter location. I define banks with head-quarters in the same state as
peers. Using these definitions, I still find a positive and significant peer e ect
in bank loan loss provision decisions.
To further examine the underlying reasons of peer e ect, I first rely on
the economic consequences of bank mimicking behavior. If the existence of
peer e ect is due to “observational learning” and banks try to improve the
estimation of future economic conditions, the timeliness of loan loss recognition
should improve. On the contrary, if banks are mimicking for opportunistic
reasons, the timeliness of loan loss provision of their provisions should deteriorate.
To shed light on the economic consequences of peer e ect, I first construct
an indicator to measure the magnitude of peer e ects on a bank’s discretionary
loan loss provision. The measure is based on the incremental explanatory
power by including peer average idiosyncratic return in a loan loss provision
prediction model following Beatty and Liao (2014). The method is similar
to the construction of bank timeliness of loan loss recognition (Beatty and
Liao, 2011; Bushman and Williams, 2012, 2015). I then define banks as more
a ected by their peers if the inclusion of peer average idiosyncratic return
increases R-square. I find that banks more a ected by their peers appear
to be more timely in loan loss recognition. Their loan loss provision is more
associated with concurrent and future change of non-performing loans. The
consequence tests indicate that peer e ect benefits a bank’s loss provision
recognition and a bank’s financial reporting quality. The net e ect of mimicking
peers suggest that “observational learning” is the main reason of peer e ect.
To further test whether “observational learning” is driving the peer e ect, I
run a cross-sectional test based on the prediction that banks with lower ability
managers should be more a ected by their peers. I find that this indeed is the
case.
I also examine whether opportunistic reasons of mimicking play a role. To
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examine the role of regulatory scrutiny, I use the increase of minimum assets
threshold to submit regulatory filing (FR Y-9C) as an exogenous change of
peer e ect. The change of threshold significantly reduces the number of small
banks that are required to submit regulatory filings. Remaining small filers
are more homogeneous. Regulator’s calculation of peer allowance distribution
is thus less noisy for small banks. These filers potentially face more stringent
regulatory scrutiny. If regulatory pressure plays a role, I expect the peer e ect
to be stronger for the small filers. I find that the peer e ect indeed increases
for banks in the small sized peer group after 2006. I then examine the role of
performance pressure based on the conjecture that banks in general do not
have strong incentives to increase their provisions due to performance pressure.
Consistent with this view, I find that peer e ect is asymmetric. Peer e ect
is weaker during recessions when banks have pressure to increase provisions
Peer e ect is stronger when peers are decreasing their allowances. In summary,
there are also opportunistic reasons for banks to mimic their peers.
Information cascade (Bikhchandani et al., 1992) and endogenous timing
theory (Gul and Lundholm, 1995) provides alternative explanations of why
banks may be a ected by each other. I run additional tests to examine whether
these theories can also help to explain my results. To examine the possibility
of information cascade, I conduct a leader follower analysis. I define banks
that have larger idiosyncratic shocks as leaders and followers otherwise. The
results suggest leaders are more a ected by followers while followers are not
influenced by leaders. This is inconsistent with information cascade as followers
should at least be a ected by leaders. I examine the reporting date of banks
and find that the reporting date remain relatively stable over time. This is
inconsistent with the endogenous timing theory, in which a bank may deliberately
adjusting their reporting time as a strategic reaction to their peers’ reporting
date choice.
I run several robustness tests. I divide the sample into four sub-periods
based on business cycle or regulation regime. I find a positive peer e ect over
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time. For regulator’s definition of peers, I find that banks do not respond to
non-peer bank actions. After controlling for instrumented non-peer average
loan loss provisions, the results still hold for smaller groups. Using variance
ratio based method proposed by Graham (2008), I also identify a significant
peer e ect at the subsidiary commercial bank level.
This study makes following contributions. First of all, this study provides
new insights in understanding bank managers’ discretion in loan loss provision
and how it a ects bank transparency. Extensive studies examine what determines
a bank managers’ use of discretionary loan loss provision. This study provides
evidence that the interactions between bank’s financial reporting is another
important economic factor. Prior studies do not have a consensus on whether
the discretionary loan loss provision is beneficial. Abundant evidences document
that the discretion is opportunistically used, which leads to deteriorated bank
accounting quality. However, recent studies also document potential benefits
of discretionary loan loss provision (Bushman and Williams, 2012, 2015; Beck
et al., 2016; Jin et al., 2016). My study suggests that managers’ discretionary
adjustment of provisioning due to “observational learning” and bench-marking
with peers is not all detrimental as it improves the timeliness of loan loss
recognition.
Second of all, the existence of peer e ect has important policy implications.
It helps to provide an explanation to the general trend in industry average
provisions and allowances. The industry average level of allowances and provisions
exhibits fluctuations over time. Peer e ect may provide an explanation besides
business cycle and regulation change. The reason is that peer e ect can create
“social multiplier”, whereby a small shock can lead to amplified changes as
individuals are a ected by each other. This can partly explain the tendency of
“over-reserving” or “under-reserving” in bank industry allowance level. The
mutual influence in loan loss recognition suggests that regulation of bank
allowances should also take a macroprudential approach (Borio, 2010). Not
only the bank specific level of allowances should be closely monitored, the
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industry-wide aggregate level of allowances should also be watched.
Finally, this paper also contributes to the peer e ect literature.4 Peer e ect
in the banking industry is particularly interesting as interactions among banks
lead to correlated actions that can intensify systemic risk (Acharya, 2009).
For example, Bonfim and Kim (2014) find that there is a peer e ect in bank
liquidity risk management. This study provides evidence that peer e ect also
exists in the most important bank accounting choice. However, I find evidence
that peer e ect in bank loan loss provision has potential benefits. My study
thus provides some justification for the regulators’ definition of peers and the
use of peer performance as a monitoring tool.
2 Related studies and hypotheses development
2.1 Background on bank accounting of loan loss provision
Loan loss provision is the most important bank accrual. The timing and
magnitude of loan loss recognition has significant economic consequences.
Recent studies find that loan loss recognition, especially the timeliness of
recognition, plays an important role in lending pro-cyclicality(Beatty and
Liao, 2011), e ectiveness of market monitoring of bank risk taking (Bushman
and Williams, 2012), a banks’ contribution to systemic risk (Bushman and
Williams, 2015), and regulatory intervention (Gallemore, 2016). Thus, it is
important to understand the determinants of loan loss provisions. Researchers
find various factors that may influence loan loss recognition (Black and Gallemore,
2013; Andries et al., 2016; Dou et al., 2015; Jiang et al., 2016; Bushman et al.,
2016). These studies in general examine bank specific characteristics or system
wide factors without considering how banks’ financial reporting influence each
4A burgeoning literature in corporate finance document that peer actions or outcomes
influence various aspects of firm behaviours. For example, recent studies in corporate finance
find that peer e ects play an important role in determining a firm’s capital structure (Leary
and Roberts, 2014), stock split (Kaustia and Rantala, 2015), investment (Foucault and
Fresard, 2014), executive compensation(Bizjak et al., 2008; Faulkender and Yang, 2010),
dividend policy (Popadak, 2012), and disclosure (Seo, 2016), etc.
8
other. In this paper, I examine whether peers’ loan loss provision influence
a bank’s own level of loan loss provision and how peer e ect influences the
timeliness of loan loss recognition.
Loan loss provision is the most important part of bank accounting accrual.
Loan loss provision composes a major portion of total bank accruals and
explains a significant part of the variance of total accruals (Beatty and Liao,
2014) . U.S. GAAP governs the recognition of loan losses.5 The current accounting
rule for loan losses is referred to as “incurred loss model” because losses are
recognized only when they are “probable” and have been incurred as of the
financial statement date. The standards do not provide specific definition
on whether a loan is impaired and the amount of reserves to be recognized,
which leads to ample room for managerial discretion. Even so, following the
recent financial crisis, bank regulators blame the “incurred loss” model for
reducing the timeliness of loan loss recognition (Dugan, 2009) and leading to
more pro-cyclical lending (Beatty and Liao, 2011).
After the financial crisis, a more forward looking “expected credit loss”
model is adopted and will be implemented in the banking industry in the
near future. In U.S., a CECL (current expected credit loss) model will replace
the current “incurred loss” model. Under the new CECL model, banks are
required to estimate the expected loss over the “life of the loan” using historical
information, current conditions, and reasonable forecasts. Essentially, the
most significant change is to grant managers more discretion in incorporating
forward looking information in estimating loan losses.
Loan loss provision not only reflects the underlying loan portfolio quality,
but also plays an important role in credit risk management and regulatory
capital management. Since loan loss provision reduces bank earnings, it reduces
5Related accounting rule for the recognition and measurement of loan losses are SFAS
No. 5, Accounting for Contingencies (1975), SFAS No. 114, Accounting by Creditors for
Impairment of a Loan (1993), and SFAS No. 118, Accounting by Creditors for Impairment
of a Loan: Income Recognition and Disclosure (1994). SFAS No. 114 and SFAS No. 118 do
not apply to individually small, homogeneous loans for which loan losses are estimated at
portfolio level.
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a bank’s Tier 1 risk-based capital level. After Basel I, allowances are excluded
from the calculation of Tier 1 capital and only allowed to be added to Tier
2 capital up to 1.25% of total risk-based capital. Laeven and Majnoni (2003)
recognize that loan loss provisions also play an important role in the overall
capital regulatory framework. They argue that loan loss provision need to be
an integral part of capital regulation. Dugan (2009) argues that when used
as intended, a bank can recognize an estimated loss before the loss can be
determined precisely and is actually charged o . Banks can thus build up
enough reserves to absorb losses when they are realized. In this way, those
losses will not impair a bank’s capital. Bank will remain sound and keep
extending credit.
However, it is di cult to determine the appropriate level of provision
(allowance). Arriving at an appropriate allowance involves a high degree of
judgment. The estimate of loan losses and determining the level of provisions/allowances
is inevitably imprecise and results in a range of estimates (FFIEC, 2005).
In addition, the recognition of loan loss provision can be distorted by other
factors that are not related to the underlying loan portfolio quality, for example,
the incentive to smooth earnings, or to manage regulatory capital.
Multiple regulatory agencies with di erent objectives further complicate
the recognition of loan loss provision. Public bank holding companies are
under di erent regulatory agencies. Due to di erent regulatory objectives,
bank regulators and SEC do not necessarily share the same view on what
is the optimal level of bank provisions (allowances) and the desirable level
of discretion. On one hand, BHCs and its commercial bank subsidiaries are
heavily regulated by various bank regulators, including the Federal Reserve
system, FDIC, and O ce of the Comptroller of the Currency. Bank regulators,
with the main concern of financial system stability, has an asymmetric preference
to over reserving. To be more conservative and more prepared to unforeseen
negative impact of economy, bank regulators require banks to adjust their
loan loss reserves according to changing economic conditions, which inevitably
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require more management discretion.
On the other hand, public banks’ financial reporting are regulated by SEC.
From the SEC’s perspective, the discretion allows banks to opportunistically
use loan loss provision to smooth earnings and consequently reduce the information
quality of bank financial reporting. Unverified use of loan loss provision will
aggravate bank opaqueness, dampen external monitoring, and mislead investors.
SEC requires detailed documentation to provide rationale for a bank’s loan
loss estimation. The purpose of the requirement is to reduce bank managers’
discretion and to comply with accounting rules. The di erent view reflects a
trade-o  of transparency and financial stability, although the two objectives
are not necessarily conflicting with each other (Laux, 2012). In practice, they
are not easy to reconcile.6
Given the important role of loan loss provision in bank stability and transparency,
it is necessary to understand what determines loan loss provision and its
economic consequences. Prior studies find extensive factors that influence a
bank’s discretionary loan loss provision. For example, the incentive to manipulate
earnings (Collins et al., 1995; Liu and Ryan, 2006), regulatory capital (Moyer,
1990; Beatty et al., 1995), tax treatment of loan loss provisions (Andries
et al., 2016), CEO overconfidence(Black and Gallemore, 2013), ownership
structure (Beatty et al. 2002, Nichols et al. 2009), competition (Dou et al.,
2015; Jiang et al., 2016; Bushman et al., 2016), etc. These studies do not
take bank interactions into consideration. However, banks do not act alone.
Rajan (1994) argues that due to managers’ short-term reputation concern, a
6One salient example of this conflicting view is the SEC investigation of SunTrust
Bank. SunTrust Bank maintains a relatively high level of loan loss reserves in the 1990s.
SEC alleged that the bank arbitrarily over reserves to smooth earnings and committed
accounting fraud. Following the SEC investigation, SunTrust Bank restated their financial
reporting and significantly reduced their allowances. Concerned with bank reporting quality,
SEC issued SAB No.102 in July 2001. The guidance imposes stricter requirement on the
documentation of bank loan loss provision/allowance estimation process. SEC intervention
has important e ect on bank loan loss provision/allowance. Beck and Narayanamoorthy
(2003) find that SEC intervention increases banks’ reliance on historical charge-o  rate when
estimating loan losses to be more in compliance with the “incurred loss" model. However,
bank regulators do not fully agree with SEC’s allegation that banks are over reserving (Beck
and Narayanamoorthy, 2003). They argue that SEC intervention leads to less timely loan
loss recognition and reduce the adequacy of loan loss allowances.
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bank may mimic other banks in credit policy. Recent studies in bank systemic
risk especially emphasize the inter-connectedness of bank behaviors (Acharya,
2009). Thus it is reasonable to believe that a bank’s loan loss provision is
a ected by their peers.
2.2 Hypotheses development: the economic reasons of peer
e ect in bank loan loss recognition
When estimating expected loan losses, bank managers in general possess
two sets of information. One set of information is their private information
based on their own historical data, assessment of borrower status from private
lending relationship, etc. An additional set of information is external information,
for example, the general level of allowances and provisions recognized by their
peers. In practice, external information is also used by banks. For example,
in Wells Fargo’s annual report, they state that the estimate of credit losses
include some subjective factors like “industry trends”. Bank regulators also
encourage banks to use ratio analysis relative to their peers in order to identify
diverging trends. In summary, both banks and regulators consider external
information as useful. However, it is not clear to what extent banks incorporate
peers actions in their own loan loss recognition, and the underlying incentive.
Borrowing the framework from Manski (2000) and Thalor and Sunstein
(2008), I analyse why banks may be a ected by their peers’ actions. Manski
(2000) argues that economic agents interact with each other through three
channels: constraints, expectations, and preferences. First of all, actions of
other economic agents can a ect the range of actions an individual agent
can choose. For example, consumers and firms collectively decide the supply
and demand and the equilibrium price, which consequently determines the
commodity bundle an individual can buy and the amount of production a
firm is willing to produce. Second of all, economic agents seek to draw lessons
from others’ actions or outcomes to update their own expectation. Lastly,
preference interactions occur when an economic agent’s preference ordering of
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alternative choices are a ected by others’ actions. Under this paper’s research
context, I argue that the peer e ect in bank loan loss provision is mainly due
to expectation interaction and constraint interaction.
Similar to the expectation interaction, banks may mimic other banks due
to the di culty of the loan loss estimation. Peer bank’s action may provide
information for a bank to adjust its own level of loan loss provision. Banks’
own experiences of its prior non-performing loans and charge-o s provide
information as to how much loan loss provision a bank should provide. However,
this information may subject to some idiosyncratic component and thus contains
some noise. Operating under similar economic conditions, peer average level
of loan loss provision may provide some additional information as whether a
bank’s loan loss estimation is overly optimistic or overly pessimistic. Khan and
Ozel (2016) find that loan portfolio quality can help to predict local economic
performance. To the extent that aggregated peer average provisions/loan
quality is positively associated with future economy, mimicking can potentially
improve the accuracy and timeliness of loan loss provision. This is especially
possible when bank managers are less capable of consolidating and analysing
complicated information.
On the other hand, banks may mimic their peers not to extract information,
but because peer banks’ loan loss provision influences the available range of
loan loss provision a bank is willing to recognize due to regulation pressure
and competition. First of all, regulatory pressure leads to mimicking with
peers. When peer banks on average are increasing loan loss provision, a bank
also has the pressure to increase loan loss provision. Bank regulators in general
encourage banks to be conservative and set aside more loan loss reserves.
Significantly lower level of loan loss reserves thus leads to more regulatory
questioning and examination. However, this regulatory pressure will be partly
relieved if on average banks are reducing loan loss provision. When faced with
bank regulatory scrutiny, banks may use its peer’s action as a defense of their
own choice. For example, a relatively weak bank may reduce their loan loss
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reserve, and use their peers average loan loss provision as a support of stronger
economic conditions. This is especially possible for weaker banks that are
eager to boost their performance. As a consequence, when in general banks do
not have a strong intention to increase loan loss reserves, weaker banks also do
not want to deviate and increase loan loss reserve and lead to general under
reserve.
Competition and market pressure also creates incentive to mimic. Banks,
especially public banks, face performance pressure from the market and external
shareholders. Rajan (1994) argues that bank managers are rational but face
short-term reputation concerns. This external pressure leads to inter-depend
credit policy in order to manage earnings. Similar to this argument, bank
managers may manipulate provisions in order to beat or meet with their
peer’s performance. When peer banks are increasing loan loss provision, banks
may have a pressure to increase loan loss provision. This is because if a bank
maintains a lower reserve than its peers’, investors will question the sustainability
of the bank’s earnings in the future, even the bank is relatively safe. On the
other hand, if peer banks are reducing loan loss provision, a bank also has an
incentive to reduce loan loss provision in order to boost their performance and
to catch up with its competitors.
In summary, regardless of the underlying intention, banks have incentives
to follow their peers to adjust their provisions. Thus I propose the following
main hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: Ceteris Paribus, a bank will increase(decrease) loan loss
provision if its peers are increasing (decreasing) loan loss provision.
While di erent incentives imply similar positive peer e ect, they have
very di erent predictions regarding the economic consequence of loan loss
estimation, especially the timeliness of loan loss recognition. To help distinguish
the underlying economic channels of peer e ect among banks, I rely on the net
economic consequences of peer e ect. If average peer provisions can provide
supplemental information and assist a bank’s loan loss estimation, mimicking
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with others is potentially beneficial. Relatively weak banks that lack the
ability to consolidate and analyse data can benefit from other banks’ information
externalities. In general, loan loss estimation can be systematically improved.7
On the other hand, if banks opportunistically mimic others in order to
avoid regulation cost or to manipulate market expectation, they may intentionally
forgo some private information and put excess weight on other banks’ actions.
In this case, a bank’s provision is less associated with their own loan portfolio
quality. The informativeness of their reporting will deteriorate.
While the two channels are not mutually exclusive, the main interest is in
the net e ect. I propose the second null hypothesis based the possibility that
mimicking is due to opportunistic reasons and it dominates the benefits of
information externalities. I propose that peer e ect in bank loan loss provision
reduces information content of loan loss provision:
Hypothesis 2: A bank is less timely in loan loss recognition if it incorporates
peer actions in loan loss estimation.
3 Empirical design and identification strategy
3.1 Definition of bank peers
The definition of peers is important. Since this study focuses on one specific
industry, the generally used industry classification is not feasible. Instead, I
define peer groups mainly based on their size. Given the crucial role regulators
play in the banking industry, I first follow regulators’ definition of peers. The
Federal Reserve use Bank Holding Company Performance Report as an analytic
tool to monitor banks. The BHCPR includes a Peer Group Average Report,
which divides top tier bank holding companies into di erent groups based
on the consolidated total assets. I follow their asset cut-o  and divide banks
7In extreme cases where every bank only adjust their provisions by observing and
mimicking their peers’ actions, provisions may be completely irrelevant to the underlying
loan portfolio quality and economic conditions. However, this is unlikely to happen in reality.
I take a more moderate view where banks balance the benefits and costs of mimicking others
and allocate a reasonable weight to their peers’ actions.
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into 4 sub-groups: Group 1 are banks with total assets of $10 billion and over,
Group 2 are banks with assets between $3 billion and $10 billion, Group 3 are
banks with assets between $1 billion to $3 billion, and Group 4 are banks with
total assets below $1 billion.8 However, regulator’s classification is relatively
coarse. I also use alternative definitions of peers. I rank bank total assets each
quarter and divide banks into 10 equal-sized sub-groups. Using this definition
increases the number of peer groups and similarity within the peer group.
Finally, I define banks with headquarters in the same state as peers. Defining
banks based on their headquarter is also variable. One reason is that banks in
the same state face the same regulator, which may facilitate the information
flow across banks. Banks with similar geographic location are also exposed to
similar local economic conditions. Thus banks are more inclined to observe
their neighbours.
3.2 Identification problem of peer e ects
The starting point of my analysis is a “linear in mean” model that includes
peer banks’ average loan loss provision (Manski, 1993; Leary and Roberts,
2014):
LLPist = –+ —LLP≠ist + “ÕX≠ist≠1 + ⁄ÕXist + ”Õµs + „Õ‹t + ‘ist (1)
LLPist stands for the level of loan loss provision for Bank i in Group s and
Quarter t. LLP≠ist is the peer bank average loan loss provision excluding
Bank i. I lag the peer actions by one quarter such that it allows banks enough
time to observe their peers’ actions and change their own provisions. X≠ist
and Xist are K-dimensional vectors of peer and bank specific characteristics
that determines bank loan loss provision. µs is group fixed e ects and ‹t is
year-quarter fixed e ects. Peer e ects are captured by — and “Õ. — measures
how peer bank actions influence a bank’s loan loss provision, while “Õ measures
8BHCPR divide banks into 8 subgroups. More detailed definition of peers used by the
BHCPR is listed in the Appendix.
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how a bank’s characteristics a ect bank action.
The inclusion of LLP≠ist in the regression creates simultaneity bias (Manksi,
1993; Leary and Roberts, 2014). Intuitively, if bank’s loan loss provision policy
a ects each other, Bank i’s loan loss provision is a function of Bank j’s and
vice versa. This means LLP≠ist≠1 is an endogenous variable and the structural
parameters cannot be identified. Manski (1993) derives that the reduced form
regression where only average peer firm characteristics are included can help
to establish the existence of peer e ect.9 However, the reduced form regression
cannot distinguish whether peers a ect a bank through their actions or their
characteristics. Since my focus is how bank provisions are a ected by their
peers’ actions, I mainly focus on the structural model as in Leary and Roberts
(2014), where I use an exogenous instrumental variable of peer average loan
loss provisions.
3.3 Identification strategy
The identification of the peer e ect — requires exogenous peer firm characteristics.
Following Leary and Roberts (2014), I use peer banks’ idiosyncratic return
as an exogenous instrument variable. Prior studies find that discretionary
loan loss provision is priced by market (Beaver et al., 1989; Elliott et al., 1991;
Gri n and Wallach, 1991; Wahlen, 1994; Liu and Ryan, 1995; Ahmed et al.,
1999; Kanagaretnam et al., 2009; Beck et al., 2016). Thus, it is possible that
bank managers may use discretionary loan loss provision to manipulate bank
earnings in order to influence bank stock performance. By using idiosyncratic
stock return as an instrument, I can also filter out the common shocks and
9More specifically, ignoring year fixed e ects and subscripts, the population equation can
be described as following: y = –+—E(y|µs)+ “ÕE(X|µs)+⁄ÕX + ”Õµj + ‘ The mean regression
of y on X and µs is then E(y|X,µj) = – + —E(y|µj) + “ÕE(X|µj) + ⁄ÕX + ”Õµj . Taking
expectations with respect to characteristics X and conditional on µj obtains the following
equilibrium condition: E(y|µj) = –+ —E(y|µj) + ⁄ÕE(X|µj) + “ÕE(X|µj) + ”Õµj . Assuming
— ”= 1, E(y|µj) = –/(1≠—)+ ((“+⁄))/(1≠—))ÕE(X|µj)+ (”/(1≠—))Õµj . Plugging back to the
mean regression yields the reduced form model: E(y|X,µj) = –úÕ +“úÕE(X|µj)+ ”úÕµj +⁄úÕX,
where –úÕ = –/(1 ≠ —), “Õ = (—⁄+ “)/(1 ≠ —))Õ, ”úÕ = (”/(1 ≠ —))Õ,⁄úÕ = ⁄Õ . In the reduced
form regression, coe cient vector on the average peer characteristics is “úÕ , which equals to
(—⁄+ “)/(1≠ —)Õ. If “úÕ is significantly di erent from zero, it indicates that either — or “Õ is
not zero.
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can help to identify a causal relation between peer actions and a firm’s own
provisioning. To the extent that bank idiosyncratic return is unrelated to
common trends in the banking industry, it satisfies the exclusion restriction
and su ces a valid instrument.
To estimate bank idiosyncratic return, I use the following augmented
market model for stock return, rist:
rist = –ist + —Mist(rmt ≠ rft) + —Bankist (r¯≠it ≠ rft) + µist (2)
rist is the total quarterly stock return for Bank i in Group s over Quarter t.
(rmt ≠ rft) is the excess market return, and (r¯≠it ≠ rft) is the excess return
on an equal-weighted banking industry portfolio return excluding Bank i’s
return. The last factor is included to remove variation in returns common
across banks. I run the equation for each bank on a rolling 60-month window.
I require at least 24 months of data to calculate the loading on the market and
industry portfolios. I then use these loadings to calculate return using next
year’s monthly return. Expected return is the fitted value, while idiosyncratic
return is the residual. Monthly expected returns and idiosyncratic returns are
then compounded to quarterly return. I calculate peer’s average idiosyncratic
return by excluding Bank i’s return. The peer average is then lagged by one
quarter and used as the instrument of peer average loan loss provision.
4 Data and descriptive statistics
4.1 Data and sample construction
Bank related financial information is from FR-Y 9C filing. Bank regulators
collect financial data from Bank Holding Companies at a consolidated level.
The information is used by regulators to assess and monitor the financial
condition of holding company organization. The FR Y-9C filing is a primary
analytical tool used to monitor financial institutions between on-site inspections.
Bank holding company that has total assets exceeding $ 500 million are mandated
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to file FR Y-9C quarterly.10 Bank holding companies are required to report
to Federal Reserve Bank no later than 40 days after the quartly end date
(45 days for December report). Files for each quarter should in general be
available 24 hours after the data are received from holding companies. 11 The
FR-Y-9C thus provides a very timely information source. Figure 1 presents the
time line of bank regulatory filing. Since previous quarter peer bank performance
are timely disclosed, I argue that banks will incorporate their peers actions
in last quarter in their own loan loss estimation. Following Beatty and Liao
(2014), the sample starts from 1993, which is post Basel I and FDICIA (1991).
In this paper, I mainly focus on public BHCs. The monthly stock returns are
from CRSP.
4.2 Control variables
Following prior studies (Beatty and Liao, 2014; Liu and Ryan, 1995), I
include a set of control variables.  NPL is the change of non-performing loan
as of total loans. I also include lagged one and two quarter of  NPL.  Loan
is quarterly loan growth. Size is logarithm of total assets. Ebllp is earnings
before income taxes and extraodinary items plus loan loss provision then
scaled by total assets. I include loan types as an additional control of bank
lending policy and the extent of discretion regarding di erent types of loans
(Liu and Ryan, 1995; Liu and Ryan, 2006). C&I is commercial and industrial
loan, Consumer is loans for individual consumer purposes. RealEstate is real
estate loans. T ier1 is risk-weighted Tier 1 capital ratio. Since this ratio is only
available since 2001, I use bank capital assets ratio to fill in the gap as in Beck
and Narayanamoorthy (2013) and Liu and Ryan (2006). Peer average of these
controls (excluding Bank i in calculation) are also included. More detailed
definitions are in included in the Appendix I.
10The asset threshold was $150 millions dollars before March, 2006. The adjustment
reflects the influence of inflation, industry consolidation, and normal assets growth.
11see https://www.chicagofed.org/banking/financial-institution-reports/bhc-
data-faq for more detail regarding the FR-Y9C report.
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4.3 Descriptive statistics
Table 1 presents the summary statistics for the main variables. The sample
consists 27,158 bank-quarter observations. The unique number of public banks
is 820. As for bank characteristics, Panel A, Table 1 shows that loan loss
provision accounts for 0.36% of total loans on average. Average quarterly
idiosyncratic return is around -3 basis points. Average quarterly change of
non-performing loan is 0.03%. Quarterly loan growth is 2.17%. Real estate
loans is the most important type of bank loans, which accounts for 68% of
total loans. Average Tier 1 risk-based capital ratio is 10.9.
Panel B, Panel C, and Panel D of Table 1 exhibits the average of bank
characteristics based on regulator’s definition of peers, ten equal sized peer
groups, and bank headquarter location respectively. A comparison of Panel B
to Panel D shows that most of the peer bank characteristics are similar across
di erent definition of peers, except the instrument variable ave. Peer IdioRet.
Panels B and C show that peer average idiosyncratic return is similar. This is
not surprising as the equal sized definition is similar to regulatory definition.
However, peer average idiosyncratic return is much smaller for the definition
using bank headquarter (-0.1 basis points compared with -0.7 in Panel B and
-0.8 in Panel C). This indicates that banks with closer geographic location
have higher equity co-movement, and thus smaller idiosyncratic return.
Table 2 presents the Pearson correlation across the key variables for di erent
definitions of peer banks. I find that peer average idiosyncratic return and a
bank’s own idiosyncratic return is positively correlated. However, the correlation
coe cient is small (0.004, 0.064, 0.133 for peer definition based on regulator,
equal size group, and headquarter location respectively). This indicates that
the idiosyncratic return measure is more bank specific. Both peer average
idiosyncratic return and a bank’s own idiosyncratic return is negatively related
to a bank’s level of loan loss provision. The correlation coe cient for a bank’s
own idiosyncratic return is much larger than peer average idiosyncratic return.
This suggests a bank’ own idiosyncratic return has a much larger influence
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than peer return shock.
Table 3 presents the summary statistic of the factor loadings and adjusted
R squares for the idiosyncratic return estimation. The average adjusted R-square
is 0.21. The mean loading on the bank industry portfolio is 0.93. The average
number of observations in each regression is around 55, while majority of the
regressions have 60 observations.
4.4 Validity of idiosyncratic return as instrument
The key identification threat stems from the correlation between peer
average idiosyncratic return and some omitted common factors. Following
Leary and Roberts (2014), I validate the instrument by examining the relation
between peer average idiosyncratic return and a bank’s future characteristics.
The reason is that if peer average idiosyncratic return is a valid instrument,
it should not be systematically related to some common trends and thus
correlated with future bank characteristics. Table 4 shows that lagged peer
average idiosyncratic return is not significantly related to most bank characteristics.
Peer idiosyncratic return is not significantly related to a bank’s own idiosyncratic
return, loan growth, profitability. All these factors potentially play an important
role in determining a bank’s provisions. Peer average idiosyncratic return is
only weakly related to a bank’s change of non-performing loans and certain
loan types. However, these correlations do not pose a severe threat to the
identification as they are all included in the regression.
5 Main empirical results
5.1 Existence of peer e ects
Panel A to C, Table 5 present the structural estimation of peer e ect. In
each panel, I present the second stage results using di erent specification. In
Columns (1) and (2) of each panel, I include group or state fixed e ects, while
I include bank fixed e ects in Columns (3) and (4). Columns (1) and (3) do
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not control for peer average characteristics.
Panel A, Table 5 shows that the coe cient on the instrumented peer average
loan loss provision in the second stage ranges from 1.2541 (t = 4.91) in Column
(3) to 1.5879 (t = 4.76) in column (2). All coe cients on the instrumented
peer average loan loss provisions are positive and statistically significant. The
relation is also economically significant. A 10% increase of peer average loan
loss provision leads to 12.25% to 15.59% increase in a bank’s own loan loss
provision.
As for firm specific controls, I find that loan loss provision is positively
and significantly related to current and lagged change of non-performing
loans. Consistent with prior studies, loan loss provision is negatively related
to bank loan growth. Laeven and Majnoni (2003) find similar relation between
loan growth and loan loss provision. They argue that this is worrisome as
banks should set aside more reserves when they have higher loan growth.
Surprisingly, I find that Ebllp is negatively related with loan loss provision,
which is opposite to prior evidence of earnings smoothing through loan loss
provision.12
The estimated coe cients on peer banks’ average characteristics indicate
that majority of the peer characteristics are not significantly related to a
bank’s loan loss provision. The exception is peer banks’ average change of
non-performing loan and earnings before loan loss provision. The estimated
coe cient on peer banks’ average change of non-performing is -0.3041 (t =
-3.18) in Column (2). This finding indicates that when peer banks has an
increase in non-performing loans, a bank will reduce their own loan loss provision.
Coe cients on the peer average Ebllp is negative and significant. This indicates
there is possible earnings bench-marking through loan loss provision. After
controlling a bank’s own earnings performance, a bank may further reduce
their provisions when their peers have a high Ebllp.
12Using same regression as prior studies, I find that Ebllp is positively related to LLP
when I control macroeconomic factors and use data before financial crisis.
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Panel B, 5 exhibits similar results for peer definition based on ten equal
sized group. The coe cient on the instrumented peer average loan loss provision
ranges from 1.7009 (t = 4.04) in Column (3) to 1.9129 (t = 3.82) in Column
(4). The magnitude of the coe cient is larger than in Panel A. This suggests
that a more refined definition of peer group captures banks’ formation of peers
better than the regulators’ simple classification. Panel C shows that there is
also significant peer e ect if I use bank headquarter to define peers. However,
the coe cients are much smaller. The estimated coe cients on instrumented
peer average loan loss provision ranges from 0.2910 (t = 1.80) in Column (1)
to 0.3541 (t = 1.89) in Column (4). The first stage results indicate that lagged
peer average idiosyncratic return is significantly related to future peer average
idiosyncratic return. The F-statistics indicates that in general the instrument
passes the weak instrument test of Stock and Yogo (2005).
In summary, I find a positive and significant peer e ect in bank loan loss
recognition. The e ect is also statistically significant. The magnitude of of the
peer e ect is related to the definition of peer groups, which partially reflects
the actual select peers. The results suggest that peer groups based on size is
relatively larger than geographic location. This finding is not surprising given
deregulation allow banks to operate across states and most of the holding
companies are well diversified in geography. In next session, I try to distinguish
the underlying economic reasons of peer e ect.
5.2 Peer e ect and the timeliness of loan loss recognition
To examine the economic consequences of peer e ect, I first construct a
measure that divides banks into subgroups based on whether a bank is more
a ected by their peers. Using similar methodology to capture the timeliness
of loan loss recognition, I estimate the following two regressions for each bank
using bank time series:
LLPt = –+—1◊ NPLt≠1+—2◊ NPLt≠2+—3◊ NPLt+—4◊Sizet≠1+
—5 ◊ Loant + —6 ◊ Ebllpt + —7 ◊ T ier1t≠1 + ‘t (3)
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LLPt = –+—1◊ NPLt≠1+—2◊ NPLt≠2+—3◊ NPLt+—4◊Sizet≠1+
—5 ◊ Loant + —6 ◊Ebllpt + —7 ◊ T ier1t≠1 + —8 ◊ ave. Peer IdioRett≠1 + ‘t (4)
Equation (4) resembles a reduced form regression test of the peer e ect
where I consider peer idiosyncratic return as an exogenous peer characteristics.
I run the regression for each bank and extract the adjusted R-square. I then
use the adjusted R-square from Equation (4) minus the adjusted R-square
from Equation (3) to calculate the additional explanatory power of peer idiosyncratic
return shock. I then define an indicator variable High Peer Effect equals one
if the incremental R-square is larger than zero, and zero otherwise.
I follow Beatty and Liao (2011), Bushman and Williams (2012, 2015) to
examine how peer e ect a ects the timeliness of loan loss provision. More
specifically, I use the same loan loss provision estimation model by interacting
High Peer Effect with the current and future change of non-performing
loans. The regression I use is as following:
LLPit = – + —1 ◊  NPLit≠1 + —2 ◊  NPLit≠2 + —3 ◊  NPLit + —4 ◊
High Peer Effect+ —5 ◊High Peer Effect ◊ NPLit + —6 ◊ NPLit+1 +
—7 ◊High Peer Effect◊ NPLit+1 + —8 ◊ Sizeit≠1 + —9 ◊ Loanit + —10 ◊
Ebllpit + —11 ◊ T ier1it≠1 + ‘it (5)
If a bank incorporates forward looking information in their loan loss estimation,
I predict a positive coe cient on —3 and —6. The main variable of interest is
the coe cients on the interaction terms, —5 and —7. If a bank that is more
likely to mimic their peers for opportunistic reasons, I expect that managers
forfeit some private information and lead to less timely loan loss estimation.
In this case, I predict the coe cients on the interaction term to be negative.
On the contrary, if a bank mimic others in order to extract information, the
coe cient on the interaction term is possible to be positive.
Table 6 presents the test results of how peer e ect influences a bank’s
timeliness of loan loss recognition. I find that a bank’s loan loss provision
is positively related to current and future change of non-performing loans.
This is consistent with prior studies. The estimated coe cient on the current
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and future change of non-performing loan in Column (1) is 0.1474 (t = 6.43)
and 0.0702 (t = 3.17) respectively. This indicates banks incorporate forward
looking information in their loan loss estimation. As for the interaction term,
I find that both —5 and —7 are positive and significant. The coe cient on the
interaction term with the current change of non-performing loan ( NPLt) is
0.0799 (t = 2.57), while the coe cient on the interaction term with the future
change of non-performing loan ( NPLt+1) is 0.0594 (t = 2.18). These results
suggest if a bank that are more likely to be a ected by their peers, it is more
timely in loan loss recognition.
Columns (2) and (3), Table 6 show the results based on alternative definitions
of peer groups. The interaction term of High Peer Effect and concurrent
change of non-performing loan ( NPLt) are 0.1378 (t = 0.1174) in Column
(2) and 0.1174 (t = 2.99) in Column (4). The interaction term with next
period of change of non-performing loans ( NPLt+1) is 0.0773 (t = 2.76)
in Column (2) and 0.0375 (t = 1.77) in Column (3). Using these alternative
definitions, I still find that banks more a ected by their peers seem to be more
timely in their loan loss recognition.
5.3 Managerial ability and peer e ect
To further strengthen the possibility that “observational learning” drives
peer e ect, I explore the cross-sectional di erences of the magnitude of incorporating
peer actions in a bank’s loan loss recognition. If observational learning drives
the peer e ects, I predict that managers with lower ability is more likely to be
a ected by their peers’ actions. Following (DeYoung, 1998; Beatty and Liao,
2011), I use Ebllp as a proxy of bank managers’ ability. I rank bank Ebllp
each quarter, and define High Ability equals to one if a bank’s Ebllp is higher
than sample median, and zero otherwise. I then interact High Ability with
instrumented peer average loan loss provisions. I predict that if learning drives
peer e ect, banks with higher profitability should be less a ected by their
peers. Thus the coe cient on the interaction term should be negative.
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The results are presented in Table 7. I find that the coe cient on the
interaction of High Ability and peer average loan loss provision is -0.2495 (t =
-7.24) in Column (1), which is statistically and economically significant. Using
other definition of peers find similar results. The coe cients on the interaction
term is -0.2131 (t = -6.32) when I use equal size group to define peers, and
-0.2533 (t = -5.00) when bank headquarter state is used to define peers.
In summary, I find a positive peer e ect exits across banks. The e ect is
both economically and statistically significant. Banks more a ected by their
peers are more timely in loan loss recognition. Banks with lower ability are
more a ected by their peers. These results combined suggest that “observational
learning” seems to be the main reason that drives a bank to incorporate their
peers’ actions in their loan loss recognition. However, these tests do not exclude
the possibility that banks also mimic their peers in recognizing their provisions
for opportunistic reasons. In next section, I examine whether regulatory scrutiny
and performance pressure also play a role.
5.4 Peer e ect: the role of regulatory scrutiny and performance
pressure
One alternative source of mimicking incentive is the regulator’s use of
peer average to monitor banks. To provide further evidence on the role of
regulators, I use the change of minimum assets threshold requirement for
submitting regulatory filings as an exogenous change of peer e ect. Prior to
2006, BHCs with consolidated total assets larger than $150 million have to
file FR- Y9C to the federal reserve. In 2006, the minimum assets threshold
is increased to $500 million. This significantly reduces the number of banks
in the small sized peer groups. The average number of banks before 2006
in the small sized group is 147, while it drops to 58 after 2006. This change
results in more homogeneous banks in the small sized peer groups who are
required to file the regulatory filing. Peer average ratios calculated based on
the smaller group is thus more compact, less noisy, and more relevant to the
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remaining filers. If banks benchmark on the peer average ratios reported by
the regulators, peer e ect should be stronger. Consistent with this prediction,
I find that peer e ect for the small size group in the post 2006 period is much
stronger.
Table 8 reported the test results. post is an indicator variable which equals
one if observations are in the post 2006 period. treat equals one if banks are
in size-group 4. I interact post, treat with the instrumented average peer
loan loss provisions. The results show that the interaction term is positive
and significant (0.1481, t = 3.13 in Column 1). The results are robust to
the inclusion of peer average characteristics as additional control and after
controlling for bank fixed e ects instead of group fixed e ects. The results
suggest that when regulatory scrutiny increases, banks increase their reliance
on peer actions in recognizing their loan losses. An interpretation of the increased
reliance is to reduce regulatory scrutiny.
I next examine how performance pressure a ects the magnitude of peer
e ect. I rely on the asymmetric preference of loan loss recognition in testing
how performance pressure influences the magnitude of peer e ect. In general,
banks have a stronger incentive to reduce loan loss provisions. There are two
scenarios where banks are less inclined to follow their peers in increasing their
provisions. The first one is when economy is in recessions. During economic
recessions, loan defaults as well as uncertainty about future defaults increase.
Banks are expected to increase their provisions. However, the incentive to
manage earnings through their loan loss provision also increases (Huizinga and
Laeven, 2012). The exposure to systematic risk varies across banks and thus
the use of provision to manage earnings also di ers. Their provisions are thus
less likely to be a ected by their peers. The other case is when the banking
industry is in upward trending, and in general peers are increasing provisions,
a bank is less likely to follow their peers in the same magnitude of reducing
their provisions as increasing provisions may reduce the reported earnings.
To test these prediction, I first construct a recession indicator, which
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equals one if economy is experiencing recession following the business cycle
date compiled by NBER. I then interact the recession indicator with the
instrumented peer average loan loss provision. If performance pressure plays a
role in altering the magnitude of a bank’s incorporate of peer actions, I predict
the interaction term of recession and ave.Peer LLPt≠1 to be negative. I also
construct an decrease dummy, which equals one if a bank’s peers are reducing
their total allowance level in the prior quarter. Similarly, I interact decrease
with ave.Peer LLPt≠1. I predict that the coe cient will be positive.
The test results are shown in Table 9. Similarly, Panel A to Panel C present
results using regulator’s definition, equal sized group, and headqaurter location
to define peers respectively. Consistent with my prediction, I find that there
is a weaker peer e ect during economic recessions. The coe cient on the
interaction term in Panel A is -1.1859 (t = 4.46) in Column (1) and -1.3828
(t = -2.16) in Column (2). On the contrary, when peers are decreasing allowances,
the peer e ect is stronger. The coe cient on the interaction term of decrease
and ave.Peer LLPt≠1 is 0.4102 (t = 2.11) in Column (3) and 0.3885 (t = 2.84)
in Column (4). This finding is consistent with the conjecture that there is an
asymmetric preference in incorporating peer actions in recognizing provisions.
While the net e ect suggests that peer e ect has beneficial consequences, I can
not rule out the possibility that banks may opportunistically choose the extent
to follow their peers. In summary, under certain circumstances, banks also
increase their reliance on their peers due to external pressure like regulatory
scrutiny and peer competition. In these cases, banks may put excess weight on
their peers’ actions and forgo certain private information.
5.5 Discussion: implications for the regulation of allowances/loan
loss provision
While I find that peer e ect has some beneficial e ect on bank loan loss
recognition, it is unclear how it can help alleviate the regulatory concern. The
main regulatory concern following the financial crisis is that banks do not
28
recognize loan loss provision su ciently and timely before the crisis. When
banks are hit by economic downturn, they have to increases their recognition
of loan loss provision, or reduce their lending in order to keep solvent. The
current “incurred loss” model is in the center of regulatory debate. Regulators
argue that the “incurred loss” model is backward looking and deters the timeliness
of loan loss recognition. Peer e ect can potentially help alleviate the regulatory
concern if certain groups of banks can take the lead and increase a significant
amount of provisions/allowances before the financial crisis. However, it should
be noted that since banks do not have an incentive to increase provisions, the
magnitude that peer e ect in reducing delayed loan loss recognition is hard to
determine.
Another implication of peer e ect is that it creates “social multiplier”,
whereas a bank’s own change of loan loss provisions may create a larger e ect
on the system level of provisions and allowances. This provides an additional
explanation to the industry level fluctuations of allowances and provisions.
For example, the allowances increase to a historical high level in the mid
1990s. Part of the reason may be that banks are mimicking each other, which
amplifies the increasing industry trend. An implication of this possibility is
that regulators should not only keep an eye on the bank level of allowances,
but also pay attention to the aggregate industry level of allowances.
Finally, peer e ect also has some policy implication to the “expected credit
loss” model. The adoption of more forward looking approach in estimating
credit loss is arguably the most important in bank financial reporting. However,
practitioners often argue that one big challenge of the new approach is the
quantity and quality of data to construct the estimation model. It is reasonable
to expect that banks may put more weight in their loan loss estimation under
the new regime. While this may potentially improve the timeliness of loan
loss recognition for banks with less able managers, it also raise some concerns.
The intention of “expected credit loss” model is to increase the timeliness of
loan loss recognition. If no first movers increase their provisions, others may
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also stay static even if the expected uncertainty is increasing. Since provisions
has negative impact on bank earnings and regulatory capital, it is likely to
happen. This may undermine the e ectiveness of “expected credit loss” model.
For regulatory purpose, mandating certain risky banks to increase allowances
before anticipated economic recession is desirable in theory.13
6 Additional tests of why peer e ects may exist
6.1 Observational learning and the information content of peer
idiosyncratic return
The identification strategy implicitly assumes that bank managers cannot
distinguish the di erence between loan loss provision changes that are driven
by common economic trend or idiosyncratic return shock. This is a strong
assumption. On the other hand, bank may directly infer information from
their peers stock returns and adjust their provisions. Table 13 examines whether
peer average idiosyncratic returns actually contains information for future
charge-o s. I regress a bank’s current charge-o s their peers’ average idiosyncratic
returns. The results indicates that there is a significant positive relation between
a bank’s next period charge-o s and peer average idiosyncratic return. The
estimated coe cient on peer average return is positive and significant (0.0044,
t = 4.04), while a bank’s own idiosyncratic shock lead to a lower charge-o .
The negative relation between a bank’s own idiosyncratic return coincides
with a bank’s loan portfolio quality. However, peer average idiosyncratic
return indicates a stronger economic prediction, which lead to stronger bank
performance. Banks may increase their loan loss provision to smooth earnings.
To obscure the income smoothing, banks can accelerate charge-o s (Liu and
Ryan, 2006). This potentially lead to a positive relation with charge-o s and
13The implementation of early mandated increase in allowances/provisions may be hard
to implement as the loss function of regulatory mistake is asymmetric as regulators prefer ex
post remedy than ex ante premature actions (Boot and Thakor, 1993; Bisias, Flood, Lo, and
Valavanis, 2012).
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idiosyncratic return. However, this explanation suggests that charge-o  can
be opportunistically used, and thus not a good way to distinguish the learning
channel.14
6.2 Observational learning and learning horizon
I include lagged 2 quarter and 3 quarter peer average loan loss provision to
examine whether lagged peer actions also a ect a bank’s loan loss provision.
The main test indicates that it is the observational learning that mainly drives
the result. In this case, a bank should mainly respond to recent period information
instead of old information. The test results are included in Table 10. The
results suggest that when peers are defined as equal-sized peer groups, only
lagged t period loan loss provision is significant, while lagged t≠ 2 and lagged
t≠ 3 period loan loss provisions are all not significant. When peers are defined
as in regulator or based on headquarters, there is no significant result when
lagged t≠ 2 and t≠ 3 peer loan loss provisions are included. However, when only
lagged t≠ 2 period loan loss provision is included, only t≠ 1 period is significant.
6.3 Information cascade and leader-follower analysis
The information cascade theory suggests that a leader will move first, and
then followers will act after leaders. To examine whether information cascade
plays a role in driving the peer e ect, I first define banks as leaders if their
idiosyncratic return is larger than sample median, and followers otherwise.
I then repeat the main analysis. The test results are included in Table 11.
On contrary to what the information cascade theory suggests, the results
show that leader banks are more likely to be a ected by follower banks. The
coe cient on the average follower banks in column (1) and (2) are both positive
and significant. However, the coe cients on the average leader banks’s loan
loss provision in column (3) and (4) are insignificant. One possible explanation
14Using non-performing loan is potentially a more objective measure of loan portfolio
quality. However, I do not find a significant relation between peer idiosyncratic return and a
bank’s own non-performing loan.
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is that when a bank faces a larger idiosyncratic return shock, it indicates that
there is larger discrepancy between a bank managers’ perception of performance
and market valuation. The shock then pushes bank managers to put more
weight on what peers’ are doing and thus a larger peer e ect.
6.4 Clustering and the endogenous reporting date
The endogenous clustering theory suggests that when a bank strategically
interact with there peers in deciding when to adjust their loan loss provisions,
it will also create an appearance of peer e ect. For example, if a bank expect
that macro-economy is not strong enough and default is likely to increase, he
needs to increase loan loss provisions. However, he can wait for other banks to
act first to confirm his expectation. However, waiting is costly, as unprepared
for a economic recession could badly hurt his reputation. As a consequence,
banks may simultaneously increase their provisions. In this case, banks may
strategically adjust their reporting date. For example, if they find that their
reporting is earlier than their peers, they may deliberately delay their reporting
date to conceal private information. Thus, early reporter may reverse and
become late reporters next period.
To examine this alternative explanation, I construct a transition matrix
of bank reporting date. I collect bank quarterly earnings announcement date
to proxy the date when bank information is publicly available. I then rank
the reporting date, and define banks as early reporters if their reporting date
are earlier than sample median, and late reporters otherwise. I then draw
the transition matrix from t ≠ 1 to t. The results is shown in Table 12. The
results show that 80 percent of the early reporters in quarter t≠ 1 remain to be
early reporters in quarter t, and 74 percent of the late reporters remain to be
late reporters. This suggests that banks’ choice of reporting date is relatively




7.1 Peer e ect over time
The recognition of loan loss provision are inherently determined by a bank’s
lending policy and their expectation of future economic prospects. These
factors are highly related to the business cycles. Banks are highly regulated.
Regulations regarding to a bank’s allowance are also heavily influenced by
business cycles. Regulation rules and the stringency of implementation may
vary overtime. As a result, how a bank reacts to their peers’ actions in recognizing
loan loss provision may also change over time.
I further examine whether the existence of peer e ect is robust over time
and the results are not driven by bank’s particular behaviour during a specific
time period. I divide the sample into 4 sub-periods which reflect the underlying
economic conditions and regulation regime. The first sub-sample include
observations before Year 2000 (including year 2000). Liu and Ryan (2006)
argue that during this period, bank industry is experiencing a boom and
banks tend to overstate their provisions to smooth earnings. The second
period is from Years 2001 to 2006. During this period, the banking industry
experiences a booming of mortgage market following the internet bubble.
Another significant event is due to the passage of SEC SAB No.102 in 2001,
which may have important influence on a banks’ loan loss provision recognition.
The third period is the financial crisis period including Years 2007 and 2008.
The last period is post crisis period from Years 2009 to 2014.
Table 14 presents the test results for the four sub-periods. Using regulator’s
definition of peers, I find a significant peer e ect over time except for the
Years 2001 to 2006 period. Another finding is that in general, the peer e ect
is reducing through time. Peer e ect in the 1990s is especially strong, with a
estimated coe cients of 3.3069 (t = 2.40). The estimated coe cient is 0.7043
(t = 1.53) in the 2001 to 2006 period. During the financial crisis period, the
magnitude of peer e ect is 1.4417 (t = 3.16). After the financial crisis, the
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coe cient is 1.0787 (t = 3.47). One possible explanation of the change in peer
e ect over time is that the U.S. banking industry experiences dramatic merger
and acquisitions over time. Banking industry consolidation increases the
sophistication of the bank management team and thus their reliance on private
information. Another possibility is due to the more stringent regulation that
increasingly emphasizes the documentation and verification of loan loss estimation
process which leads to less management discretion. I find a similar pattern
using equal sized peer group definition. Di erent from regulator’s definition,
peer e ect is not significant in the 1990s but significant in the early 2000s.
Using headquarter state as a criteria to define peers find that there is no
significant peer e ect across all four periods. The results suggest that size
plays a more important role in identifying peers in the banking industry than
geography closeness at the holding company level.
7.2 Identification through excess variance ratio
Graham (2008) proposes an alternative methodology to identify peer e ect
(social multiplier) using conditional variance restrictions when social interactions
take the “linear in mean” form as Manski (1993). The intuition of the test
is that since individuals within a group tend to learn or be a ected by each
other, individual outcome within a group will positively covary with each
other. Excess variation between groups will present, where between group
excess variation is the residual variance between groups after taking out the
within group variation. With peer e ect, the social actions among individuals
will contribute to the excess variation.
To identify the contribution of the social interaction, Graham (2008) exploits
the variation of peer heterogeneity across sub-groups of the population, assuming
the distribution of between group heterogeneity is the same across groups.
Group size provides an exogenous variation of peer heterogeneity. For example,
in states with more banks, individuals with more low quality loans clusters
with each other, while banks with higher quality loans clusters with each other.
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The within group variation can be o set by the two di erent kinds of banks.
However, in a state with fewer banks, it is more likely to observe that banks
cluster around one kind of banks. The variation of peer heterogeneity, for
example the average loan quality, is smaller in state with more banks than
states with fewer banks.
More specifically, the regression framework used in Graham (2008) is Yci =
–c+ (“0≠ 1) ú ‘¯c+ ‘ci, where Yci is the outcome for individual i in group c. –c is
the group-level heterogeneity, ‘ci represents individual level heterogeneity. ‘¯c is
the group level mean of ‘ci. Group size can be divided to larger type (Wc = 0)
and smaller type (Wc = 1). Graham argues that the social multiplier “0 can be
identified through the following equation:
E[Gbc|Wc = 1]≠ E[Gbc|Wc = 0]
E[Gwc |Wc = 1]≠ E[Gwc |Wc = 0]
= “20
where Gbc = (Y¯c≠µY (Wc))2 is between group variance and Gwc = 1/Nc ú 1/(Nc≠
1) úqNi=1(Yci ≠ Y¯c)2 is within group variance. Nc is the number of individuals in
each group. Graham (2008) regresses between group variance on within group
variance by using group size dummy as an instrument of within group variance
to estimate the multiplier “0.
One advantage of this approach is that it does not require the use of instrument
variable that relies on stock price information. The analysis is thus not limited
to public banks. I use this approach to examine the existence of peer e ect
at the subsidiary commercial bank level. The data for the commercial banks
are from CALL report. I define banks within a state as peers. This is because
most commercial banks operate within a state (Morgan and Samolyk, 2003).
I first normalize bank level loan loss provision by running the loan loss
provision discretion Model (3) and use the residual, µˆist, as a measure of
bank’s discretionary loan loss provision. I then calculate the between and
within group variance of discretionary loan loss provision at state level. Between
group variance Gbst = (¯ˆµst ≠ µ¯t)2 is calculated as the square of state average of
the residual minus the quarter average of residual for all banks. Within group
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variance for each state is calculated as 1/(N2 ≠N) times the sum of square of
the di erence between bank level residual and state quarter average residual.
The preceding procedure generates a set of state-quarter observations of with
and between variances. I then construct an indicator variable which equals one
if the number of banks in the state is lower than the sample median. I use this
indicator variable as an instrument of the within group variance. “20 is then
the estimated coe cient on the instrumented within group variance, Gwc .
Table 15 shows the results of using variance ratio based tests. Following
the preceding section, I divide the sample into four sub-periods. I find that
the estimated “social multiplier” (“20 ) is positive and significant for majority
of the periods except the 2001 to 2006 period. This is consistent with the
findings in our preceding section. However, I find that the social multiplier is
increasing across the sub-periods, which may indicates an increasing peer e ect
over time. The estimated “20 is also significantly larger than 1 except for the
2001 and 2006 sub-sample. The first-stage F-statistics is also larger than 10
(except for the 2001 to 2006 period). This indicates that weak instrument is
not a concern.
7.3 Do banks respond to non-peer actions?
The main tests find that peer e ect exists using bank regulators’ definition.
However, the limitation of regulators’ definition is that it is static and relatively
coarse, as a more refined peer groups find a larger peer e ect. However, since
regulatory pressure plays a role in monitoring bank allowance and provisions,
banks may still find regulator’s definition of peers relevant. However, it is
possible that banks may consider regulator’s definition to be the lower bounder
of identifying peers. One way to examine this possibility is that banks should
not respond to the changes in non-peer groups. I calculate average idiosyncratic
return in non-peer groups and their average loan loss provisions. I then include
both peer group loan loss provisions and non-peer group loan loss provisions in
the regression to examine which group has a larger e ect on a bank’s own loan
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loss provision choice.
Table 16 presents my test results. Column (1) indicates that when both
peer and non-peer average loan loss provision are included, the coe cient on
the peer provisioning is still positive but insignificant (0.2967, t = 0.14). I
then divide the sample into two sub-samples. The first sub-sample includes
relatively larger banks (Group 1 and 2), while the other sub-sample includes
relatively smaller banks (Group 3 and 4). I find that there is still a positive
and significant peer e ect for smaller sized groups even controlling non-peer
group instrumented provisions. The estimated coe cient on the peer group
instrumented provisions is 2.1793 (t = 1.99). The estimated coe cient on
non-peer instrumented provisions is 3.4512 (t = 1.10), which is statistically
insignificant. The results suggest that banks, especially smaller banks, do not
respond to the non-peer group actions according to regulator’s classification.
8 Conclusions
Interactions in bank behaviours have drawn a lot of attention for both
researchers and regulators. Positively correlated bank behaviour potentially
intensify systemic risk. Using banks within the same size group as a definition
of peers, I find evidence that peer e ect exists and is economically significant
in bank financial reporting. Banks tend to mimic other banks in increasing or
decreasing loan loss provisions. The results are robust after using alternative
definitions of peer group, controlling for non-peer group actions, and sub-sample
tests based on time periods. Using variance ratio based method, I also find a
significant peer e ect.
However, I find that mimicking peers’ provisioning is not all detrimental
as the timeliness of loan loss recognition improves. To the extent that more
timely loan loss recognition can reduce lending pro-cyclicality, enhance bank
transparency, improve external monitoring, and reduce bank risk profile as
suggested in recent studies (Beatty and Liao, 2011, Bushman and Williams,
2012, 2015), peer e ect in bank loan loss provisions is beneficial.
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Table 1: Summary statistics
The sample consists publicly listed BHCs. Data source is from Bank Holding
Company regulatory filing, FR Y-9C. Data range is from the first quarter 1993
to the fourth quarter 2014. I use the peer group definition as in Federal Reserve
BHCPR Peer Group Average Reports. Panel A presents public bank specific
characteristics. Panel B shows peer average characteristics, which are calculated
by excluding bank i. Panel C compares average characteristics across four peer
groups. Group 1 are banks with total assets larger than $10 billion. Group 2 are
banks with total assets between $3 billion and $10 billion. Group 3 are banks
with total assets between $3 billion and $1 billion. Group 4 are bank with total
assets lower than $1 billion. Panel D shows summary statistics for private BHCs.
Panel E exhibits the Pearson correlation across key variables. LLP is loan loss
provision scaled by beginning of period total loans. IdioRet is a bank’s own
idiosyncratic stock return.  NPL is quarterly change of non-performing loan
as of total loans.  Loan is quarterly loan growth. Size is logarithm of total
loans. Ebllp is earnings before extraordinary items and tax plus back loan loss
provision. C&I is commercial and industrial loans, RealEstate is real estate
loans, and Consumer is consumer loans. Tier1 is tier 1 risk-weighted capital
ratio. For sample before 2001, Tier 1 is replaced by capital assets ratio instead.
Panel A: Public bank specific characteristics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. P25 P50 P75
LLPt 27158 .0036 .0069 .0007 .0017 .0037
IdioRett 27158 -.003 .1139 -.078 -.0099 .0658
 NPLt 27158 .0003 .006 -.0016 0 .0017
 NPLt≠1 27158 .0002 .0059 -.0016 0 .0017
 NPLt≠2 27158 .0002 .0058 -.0016 0 .0017
 Loant 27158 .0217 .0399 -.0031 .0165 .0392
Sizet 27158 14.6724 1.6788 13.4674 14.3194 15.5565
Ebllpt 27158 .0104 .0066 .0053 .0095 .0146
C&It 27158 .1794 .1273 .0948 .1531 .229
RealEstatet 27158 .6796 .1899 .5734 .7088 .8188
Consumert 27158 .0136 .0499 0 .0009 .0064
T ier1t 27158 10.8718 3.0726 8.5844 10.42 12.61
Panel B: Peer average characteristics based on regulator’s definition
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. P25 P50 P75
IdioRett≠1 27158 -.0007 .0446 -.0205 .0018 .0185
Sizet≠1 27158 14.6153 1.5909 13.1247 14.3266 15.4636
 NPLt≠1 27158 .0003 .004 -.001 0 .0018
 Loant≠1 27158 .0294 .0198 .0178 .0294 .0418
Ebllpt≠1 27158 .0107 .0054 .0055 .0102 .015
C&It≠1 27158 .1791 .0376 .1507 .1803 .195
Consumert≠1 27158 .0131 .0227 0 .004 .0101
RealEstatet≠1 27158 .6798 .101 .6189 .7012 .7626
T ier1t≠1 27158 11.1915 2.2688 9.0126 11.4576 13.0487
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Table 1: Summary statistics
Panel C: Peer average characteristics based on 10 equal size group
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. P25 P50 P75
IdioRett≠1 27109 -.0008 .0525 -.0276 .0002 .0255
Sizet≠1 27109 14.6452 1.6254 13.4299 14.2548 15.6686
 NPLt≠1 27109 .0003 .0041 -.001 0 .0018
 Loant≠1 27109 .0297 .0238 .0153 .0288 .0421
Ebllpt≠1 27109 .0108 .0055 .0055 .0102 .0151
C&It≠1 27109 .179 .0402 .1511 .1769 .1993
Consumert≠1 27109 .0131 .0244 0 .0034 .0104
RealEstatet≠1 27109 .6793 .1052 .6216 .6981 .7603
T ier1t≠1 27109 11.1837 2.469 8.9914 11.3738 13.0376
Panel D: Peer average characteristics based on headquarter state
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. P25 P50 P75
IdioRett≠1 24663 -.0001 .0631 -.0305 -.001 .0289
Sizet≠1 24663 14.4136 .7489 13.8439 14.4108 14.8384
 NPLt≠1 24663 .0003 .0049 -.0011 0 .0015
 Loant≠1 24663 .0274 .0269 .011 .025 .0414
Ebllpt≠1 24663 .0104 .0055 .0053 .0097 .0143
C&It≠1 24663 .1734 .0519 .1349 .166 .2065
Consumert≠1 24663 .0124 .0241 0 .0036 .0113
RealEstatet≠1 24663 .6942 .0801 .6361 .6925 .7609


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3: Stock return estimation results
The following table presents the summary of stock return estimates using monthly
bank stock return. The sample consists publicly listed U.S. banks from 1987 to
2014. The table shows mean factor loadings and adjusted R2s from the following
regression:
Rist = –ist + —Mist(RMt ≠RFt) + —Bankist (R¯≠ist ≠RFt) + ÷ist,
where Rist is the return to bank i in state s at month t, (RMt≠RFt) is the excess
return on the market. (R¯≠ist ≠RFt) is the excess return on an equal-weighted
bank industry portfolio excluding bank i’s return. The regression is estimated on
a rolling basis using monthly data for each bank. I use up to 60 months of data
and require at least 24 months of data in the estimation. Expected returns are
fitted values using estimated loadings from prior year. Idiosyncratic return is the
residual of the market model.
Variable Mean 50th Pctl Std Dev
–it 0.0027 0.0029 0.0122
—Mit 0.0391 0.0104 0.5887
—Bankit 0.9337 0.8679 0.7137
# of Obs. per Regression 55 60 10
Adjusted R2 0.2111 0.1927 0.1607
Average Monthly Return 0.0111 0.0071 0.1079
Expected Monthly Return 0.0108 0.0131 0.0525
Idiosyncratic Monthly Return 0.0002 -0.0042 0.1004
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Table 4: Peer idiosyncratic return and bank specific characteristics
The table presents the partial correlations between lagged average peer bank
idiosyncratic return and a bank’s own characteristics. The dependent variable is
lagged one quarter peer average idiosyncratic return. Column (1) use regulator’s
definition of peers, column (2) use 10 equal sized groups to define peer. Column
(3) use bank headquarters state to define peer. All regressions include bank fixed




 NPLt 0.1384 0.3751 0.0603
(2.90)ú (2.81)úú (0.50)
 Loant 0.0010 -0.0126 -0.0206
(0.13) (-1.68) (-1.59)
Sizet 0.0015 -0.0028 -0.0026
(0.72) (-1.12) (-1.35)
Ebllpt 0.1946 0.2061 -0.1582
(0.72) (1.03) (-0.94)
C&It 0.0050 0.0094 0.0051
(2.37)ú (1.61) (0.34)
RealEstatet -0.0002 0.0122 0.0014
(-0.03) (1.54) 0.0014
Consumert -0.0180 -0.0105 0.0147
(-2.05) (-1.19) 0.0147
T ier1t -0.0000 0.0001 -0.0005
(-0.15) (0.12) (-1.51)
ChargeOfft 0.1564 0.1856 -0.0135
(1.40) (1.29) (-0.11)
Allwoancet 0.0694 0.0681 0.0010
(3.65)úú (0.76) (0.01)
Bank FE YES YES YES
Quarter FE YES YES YES
Peer average characteristics YES YES YES
Bank idiosyncratic return YES YES YES
N 27156 24638 24661
adj. R2 0.299 0.235 0.123
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Table 5: Peer e ect in bank loan loss recognition
This table presents the second stage results of 2SLS estimates of peer e ect using
lagged peer average idiosyncratic return as the instrumental variable of peer
average loan loss provision. Dependent variable is a bank’s loan loss provision
scaled by beginning of period total loans (LLPt). Firm specific and peer average
characteristics are included. Peer definition in Panel A is based on regulator’s
classification. Panel B use 10-equal sized group to define peers. Panel C use bank
headquarter state to define peers. Peer average characteristics are lagged by one
quarter. Column (1) and column (2) include group fixed e ects (Panel A, B),
or state fixed e ects (Panel C) and year-quarter fixed e ects. Column (3) and
(4) include bank fixed e ects and year-quarter fixed e ects. Standard errors are
adjusted for clustering at group level (column (1), (2) for Panel A and B), state
level (Column (1), (2) for Panel C), or bank level (column (3), (4) for Panel A,
B, and C).
Panel A: Peers based on regulator’s definition
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ave. Peer LLPt≠1 1.3046 1.5879 1.2541 1.5614
(9.17)úúú (4.76)úúú (4.91)úúú (4.86)úúú
 NPLt 0.1275 0.1281 0.1018 0.1026
(3.56)úúú (3.61)úúú (5.38)úúú (5.39)úúú
 NPLt≠1 0.1972 0.1993 0.1690 0.1713
(6.81)úúú (6.54)úúú (9.70)úúú (9.71)úúú
 NPLt≠2 0.2104 0.2099 0.1786 0.1784
(6.93)úúú (6.95)úúú (9.44)úúú (9.38)úúú
 Loant -0.0181 -0.0182 -0.0170 -0.0175
(-4.99)úúú (-4.77)úúú (-10.13)úúú (-10.23)úúú
Sizet 0.0003 0.0003 0.0001 0.0006
(1.95)ú (1.76)ú (0.52) (2.04)úú
Ebllpt -0.1751 -0.1788 -0.2846 -0.2903
(-4.20)úúú (-4.24)úúú (-8.36)úúú (-8.55)úúú
C&It 0.0042 0.0042 0.0051 0.0054
(3.77)úúú (3.82)úúú (2.54)úú (2.69)úúú
RealEstatet 0.0005 0.0005 0.0025 0.0025
(0.71) (0.78) (1.47) (1.49)
Consumert 0.0174 0.0176 0.0032 0.0027
(3.01)úúú (2.90)úúú (0.70) (0.59)
T ier1t≠1 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003
(-7.04)úúú (-7.39)úúú (-6.29)úúú (-6.25)úúú
IdioRett -0.0035 -0.0037 -0.0028 -0.0029

















T ier1t≠1 0.0001 0.0002
(0.96) (1.84)ú
N 27158 27158 27144 27144
adj. R2 0.383 0.377 0.397 0.391
First Stage Results .0053 .0037 .0049 .0039
(4.02)úúú (3.09)úúú (18.75)úúú (16.30)úúú
F statistic 16.144 9.547 362.460 273.841
Panel B: Peers based on 10 euqal sized groups
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ave. Peer LLPt≠1 1.7114 1.7853 1.7009 1.9129
(5.16)úúú (5.12)úúú (4.04)úúú (3.82)úúú
 NPLt 0.1160 0.1160 0.0929 0.0936
(5.34)úúú (5.23)úúú (4.79)úúú (4.78)úúú
 NPLt≠1 0.1952 0.1980 0.1595 0.1624
(11.02)úúú (10.83)úúú (8.91)úúú (8.90)úúú
 NPLt≠2 0.2097 0.2099 0.1726 0.1731
(11.22)úúú (10.97)úúú (8.98)úúú (8.94)úúú
 Loant -0.0171 -0.0175 -0.0167 -0.0172
(-5.31)úúú (-5.76)úúú (-9.93)úúú (-10.01)úúú
Sizet 0.0002 0.0003 -0.0000 0.0004
(1.80)ú (1.94)ú (-0.05) (1.12)
Ebllpt -0.1768 -0.1788 -0.2928 -0.2963
(-4.02)úúú (-4.18)úúú (-8.28)úúú (-8.31)úúú
C&It 0.0040 0.0040 0.0052 0.0052
(4.46)úúú (4.13)úúú (2.58)úúú (2.53)úú
RealEstatet 0.0005 0.0005 0.0026 0.0026
(0.65) (0.65) (1.52) (1.47)
Consumert 0.0177 0.0180 0.0038 0.0036
(2.71)úúú (2.60)úúú (0.85) (0.78)
T ier1t≠1 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0004
(-7.59)úúú (-8.58)úúú (-6.45)úúú (-6.48)úúú
IdioRett -0.0034 -0.0035 -0.0030 -0.0031

















T ier1t≠1 0.0001 0.0001
(4.24)úúú (2.97)úúú
N 24640 24640 27096 27096
adj. R2 0.332 0.329 0.337 0.319
First Stage Results .0027 .0024 .0024 .0020
(2.44)úúú (2.57)úúú (8.83)úúú ( 8.81)úúú
F statistic 5.947 6.590 80.337 79.992
Panel C: Peers based on bank headquarter state
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ave. Peer LLPt≠1 0.2910 0.3269 0.3265 0.3541
(1.80)ú (2.10)úú (2.08)úú (1.89)ú
 NPLt 0.1104 0.1199 0.0914 0.0999
(4.46)úúú (4.34)úúú (4.76)úúú (4.82)úúú
 NPLt≠1 0.1673 0.1642 0.1472 0.1456
(7.32)úúú (7.43)úúú (8.48)úúú (8.54)úúú
 NPLt≠2 0.1775 0.1742 0.1538 0.1519
(7.32)úúú (7.55)úúú (7.88)úúú (7.88)úúú
 Loant -0.0183 -0.0177 -0.0164 -0.0161
(-7.78)úúú (-9.01)úúú (-9.22)úúú (-9.24)úúú
Sizet 0.0002 0.0002 0.0003 0.0003
(2.40)úú (2.43)úú (1.08) (1.13)
Ebllpt -0.1733 -0.1657 -0.2629 -0.2547
(-4.28)úúú (-4.36)úúú (-7.23)úúú (-7.06)úúú
C&It 0.0043 0.0042 0.0058 0.0057
(4.45)úúú (4.27)úúú (2.84)úúú (2.79)úúú
RealEstatet 0.0005 0.0005 0.0023 0.0024
(0.63) (0.66) (1.38) (1.44)
Consumert 0.0103 0.0102 -0.0034 -0.0033
(2.57)úú (2.50)úú (-1.48) (-1.44)
T ier1t≠1 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003
(-6.45)úúú (-6.36)úúú (-5.59)úúú (-5.60)úúú
IdioRett -0.0031 -0.0031 -0.0026 -0.0026

















T ier1t≠1 0.0000 0.0000
(0.11) (0.10)
N 24663 24663 24650 24650
adj. R2 0.422 0.426 0.424 0.426
First Stage Results -.0051 -.0045 -.0052 -.0042
(-3.76)úúú (-4.66)úúú (-10.09)úúú (-9.93)úúú
F statistic 14.168 21.703 105.155 67.074
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Table 6: Peer e ect and the timeliness of loan loss recognition
This table shows whether peer e ect a ect the timeliness of loan loss provision.
High Peer Effect equals one if a bank’s incremental R-square of including
peer average idiosyncratic return in its loan loss provision prediction model
is larger than zero, and zero otherwise. I interact High Peer Effect with
contemporaneous change of non-performing loan ( NPLt) and next period
change of non-performing loans ( NPLt+1) following Beatty and Liao (2011).
Column (1) follow regulators to define peer banks. Column (2) define peer banks
by dividing the sample into ten equal sized groups. Column (3) define peers
based on their headquarter state. The regression includes quarter fixed e ects.
Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at bank level.
(1) (2) (3)
High Peer Effect◊ NPLt 0.0799 0.1378 0.1174
(2.57)úú 0.1174 (2.99)úúú
High Peer Effect◊ NPLt+1 0.0594 0.0773 0.0375
(2.18)úú (2.76)úúú (1.77)ú
High Peer Effect 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002
(0.69) (1.67)ú (1.39)
 NPLt 0.1474 0.1235 0.0816
(6.43)úúú (5.80)úúú (4.78)úúú
 NPLt+1 0.0702 0.0633 0.0461
(3.17)úúú (2.89)úúú (2.88)úúú
 NPLt≠1 0.2232 0.2312 0.1329
(10.05)úúú (10.10)úúú (7.72)úúú
 NPLt≠2 0.2051 0.2121 0.1238
(9.34)úúú (9.51)úúú (6.36)úúú
 Loant -0.0163 -0.0158 -0.0044
(-8.09)úúú (-7.89)úúú (-5.09)úúú
Sizet 0.0002 0.0002 0.0003
(3.19)úúú (3.16)úúú (4.00)úúú
Ebllpt -0.1569 -0.1557 -0.0672
(-5.50)úúú (-5.45)úúú (-2.40)úú
C&It 0.0032 0.0030 0.0039
(2.27)úú (2.07)úú (3.06)úúú
RealEstatet 0.0003 0.0002 0.0008
(0.25) (0.13) (0.85)
Consumert 0.0159 0.0158 0.0118
(3.66)úúú (3.64)úúú (3.96)úúú
T ier1t≠1 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0000
(-5.95)úúú (-5.99)úúú (-1.03)
_cons 0.0034 0.0035 -0.0013
(2.03)úú (2.06)úú (-0.91)
N 24146 23765 21604
adj. R2 0.419 0.427 0.404
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Table 7: Managerial ability and the magnitude of peer e ect
This table presents the second stage results of whether bank managerial ability
a ect the magnitude of peer e ect in loan loss recognition. I use pre-provision
return on assets (Ebllp) as a proxy for management quality as suggested by
DeYoung (1998), Beatty and Liao (2011). I rank bank Ebllp each quarter, and
define High Ability equals one if a bank’s Ebllp is higher than sample median,
and zero otherwise. I then interact High Ability with instrumented peer average
loan loss provisions. Dependent variable is a bank’s loan loss provision scaled by
beginning of period total loans (LLPt). Column (1) define peers based on bank
regulator’s classification in BHCPR. Column (2) define peers by divide banks
into ten equal size subgroups each quarter. Column (3) define peers based on
their headquarter state. Banks with headquarter within same state are defined
as peers.
(1) (2) (3)
High Abilityt ◊ ave.Peer LLPt≠1 -0.2495 -0.2131 -0.2533
(-7.31)úúú (-6.32)úúú (-5.00)úúú
ave.Peer LLPt≠1 0.6897 0.4207 0.5544
(6.90)úúú (6.21)úúú (8.87)úúú
High Abilityt 0.0013 0.0011 0.0009
(6.82)úúú (5.96)úúú (5.18)úúú
N 27144 27096 24650
adj. R2 0.415 0.411 0.433
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Table 8: Regulatory pressure and peer e ect in loan loss recognition
This table presents the test results of how peer group size change a ect the
magnitude of peer e ect in the small sized group. The asset-size threshold for
filing the FR Y-9C increases from $150 million to $500 million e ective with
the March 2006 report date. Post is an indicator variable which equals one if
observations are after fourth quarter, 2006. Treat is an indicator variable which
equals one if the banks are in size group 4, and zero otherwise. Column (1) and
(2) include group fixed e ects and year-quarter fixed e ects. Column (3) and
(4) include bank fixed e ects and year-quarter fixed e ects. Standard errors are
adjusted for clustering at group level.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
LLPt LLPt LLPt LLPt
post◊ treat◊ ave. Peer LLPt≠1 0.1456 0.3189 0.1425 0.2761
(2.90)úúú (2.18)úú (2.71)úúú (2.27)úú
ave. Peer LLPt 1.4606 2.1216 1.4040 1.9651
(6.86)úúú (3.68)úúú (6.97)úúú (4.66)úúú
 NPLt 0.1246 0.1250 0.1012 0.1019
(3.74)úúú (3.82)úúú (3.13)úúú (3.19)úúú
 NPLt≠1 0.1855 0.1879 0.1609 0.1634
(6.87)úúú (6.53)úúú (7.09)úúú (6.70)úúú
 NPLt≠2 0.1940 0.1929 0.1671 0.1664
(6.47)úúú (6.44)úúú (6.95)úúú (6.87)úúú
 Loant -0.0235 -0.0236 -0.0222 -0.0226
(-5.19)úúú (-4.90)úúú (-5.68)úúú (-5.44)úúú
Sizet 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0007
(1.80)ú (1.71)ú (0.75) (3.40)úúú
Ebllpt -0.1750 -0.1818 -0.2901 -0.2990
(-3.93)úúú (-3.87)úúú (-4.57)úúú (-4.66)úúú
C&It 0.0044 0.0043 0.0054 0.0056
(3.82)úúú (3.87)úúú (4.59)úúú (4.93)úúú
RealEstatet 0.0006 0.0006 0.0026 0.0026
(0.84) (0.79) (3.35)úúú (3.37)úúú
Consumert 0.0178 0.0180 0.0034 0.0030
(3.16)úúú (3.07)úúú (0.85) (0.76)
T ier1t≠1 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0003
(-7.39)úúú (-8.03)úúú (-6.03)úúú (-6.18)úúú
Group FE YES YES NO NO
Bank FE NO NO YES YES
Quarter FE YES YES YES YES
Peer average characteristics NO YES NO YES
N 27111 27111 27111 27111
adj. R2 0.383 0.364 0.498 0.484
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Table 9: Performance pressure and peer e ect in loan loss recognition
This table shows the second stage test results of when banks are more inclined
to be a ected by their peers’ actions. Recession is an indicator variable which
equals to one for observations in year 2001, and from the first quarter of 2008
to second quarter of 2009 following NBER business cycle date. Decrease is an
indicator variable equals to one if peer average allowance in past two quarters is
decreasing and zero otherwise. Dependent variable is a bank’s loan loss provision
scaled by lagged total loans (LLPt). Panel A peer definition follows BHCPR.
Panel B divide banks into ten equal size groups to define peers. Panel C use
bank headquarter state as criteria to define peers. Standard errors are adjusted
for clustering at bank level.
Panel A: Peer group based on regulator’s definition
(1) (2) (3) (4)
recessiont 0.0226 0.0157
(4.46)úúú (4.32)úúú
recessiont ◊ ave. Peer LLPt≠1 -1.1859 -1.3828
(-2.11)úú (-2.10)úú
ave. Peer LLPt≠1 2.0147 2.6373 0.6943 0.8639
(4.01)úúú (3.44)úúú (2.02)úú (2.51)úú




Group Fixed E ects Yes Yes NO No
Peer characteristics No Yes No Yes
Bank Fixed E ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 27158 27158 27158 27158
adj. R2 0.365 0.342 0.385 0.384
Panel B: Peer definition based on 10 equal sized groups
recessiont 0.0039 0.0044
(2.19)úú (2.18)úú
recessiont ◊ ave. Peer LLPt≠1 -3.9256 -5.8669
(-1.73)ú (-1.41)
ave. Peer LLPt≠1 4.6832 7.0338 0.4996 0.5225
(2.11)úú (1.59) (0.91) (0.90)




Group Fixed E ects Yes Yes No No
Peer characteristics No Yes No Yes
Bank Fixed E ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 24640 24640 24640 24640
adj. R2 -0.044 -0.587 0.364 0.369
pseudo R2
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Panel C: Peer definition based on headquarter state
(1) (2) (3) (4)
recessiont ◊ ave. Peer LLPt≠1 0.2129 0.0809
(0.88) (0.42)
ave. Peer LLPt≠1 0.1648 0.2815 0.3640 0.3788
(0.68) (1.39) (1.99)úú (1.93)ú
recessiont 0.0039 0.0044
(2.19)úú (2.18)úú




Group Fixed E ects Yes Yes NO No
Peer characteristics No Yes No Yes
Bank Fixed E ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 24663 24663 24663 24663
adj. R2 0.416 0.424 0.421 0.425
pseudo R2
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Table 10: Observational learning and learning horizon
I include lagged t≠ 2 and t≠ 3 period peer average loan loss provision. Column
(1) to (3) corresponds to peer definition based on regulator, equal-sized group,
and headquarter state respectively. I include bank fixed e ects and year-quarter
fixed e ects. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at bank level.
(1) (2) (3)
Regulator’s def Equal-sized group Headquarter
ave. Peer LLPt≠1 0.6335 2.0276 0.3005
(0.54) (3.16)úúú (1.58)
ave. Peer LLPt≠2 -1.3506 -0.1683 0.1248
(-0.82) (-0.25) (0.68)
ave. Peer LLPt≠3 2.4668 -0.3053 -0.1365
(0.94) (-0.28) (-0.74)
N 27123 27075 24517
adj. R2 0.374 0.313 0.421
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Table 11: Information cascade and leader follower analysis
Banks that have larger than sample median idiosyncratic return are defined as
leaders, and followers otherwise. I then calculate average idiosyncratic returns
and average loan loss provisions for leaders and followers respectively. I regress
leader banks’ loan loss provision on instrumented follower loan loss provision in
column (1) and (2), while column (3) and (4) regress followers loan loss provision
on leaders’ provisions.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
LeaderLLPt FollowerLLPt
Follower LLPt≠1 1.0418 1.1911 Leader LLPt≠1 1.1917 3.9781
(2.14)úú (3.35)úúú (0.34) (1.09)
N 12189 12167 12304 12261
adj. R2 0.384 0.367 0.434 0.404
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Table 12: Transition matrix of bank quarterly earnings announcement
date
I collect banks’ quarterly earnings announcement date as a proxy for when a
bank’s information is publicly available. I rank bank reporting date and define
banks as early reporters if their announcement date is earlier than sample median,
and later reporters if later than median date each quarter. I then draw the
transition matrix to show the proportion of banks that remain or change their
announcement date.
Report date in t
Early Late Total
Report date in t≠ 1 Early 13547 3346 16893
0.80 0.20




Table 13: Future Charge-o s and peer average idiosyncratic return
I regress a bank’s charge-o s on peer average idiosyncratic return in last quarter.
The regression includes year-quarter fixed e ects.
(1)
Charge Offt



























Table 14: Peer e ect over time
I divide the sample into four sub-periods and rerun the two stage least square
regression using each sub-sample respectively. The first sub-period includes
observations from year 1992 to 2000. The second period is from 2001 to 2006.
The third period includes observations in year 2007 and 2008. The rest of the
sample are in the fourth sub-period. Dependent variable is a bank’s loan loss
provision scaled by beginning of period total loans (LLPt). All regressions include
bank and quarter fixed e ects and adjust standard errors for clustering at bank
level.
Panel A: Peer definition based on bank regulator
1992-2000 2001-2006 2007-2008 2009-2014
ave.Peer LLPt 3.3069 0.7043 1.4417 1.0787
(2.40)úú (1.53) (3.16)úúú (3.47)úúú
N 10176 8628 2284 6043
adj. R2 -0.014 0.214 0.476 0.438
Panel B: Peer definition based on 10 equal sized group
1992-2000 2001-2006 2007-2008 2009-2014
ave.Peer LLPt 3.1579 1.0088 1.5397 1.2939
(0.65) (2.09)úú (3.61)úúú (2.70)úúú
N 10141 8620 2282 6038
adj. R2 -0.091 0.181 0.468 0.407
Panel C: Peer definition based on headquarter state
1992-2000 2001-2006 2007-2008 2009-2014
ave.Peer LLPt -0.2655 0.7925 -5.5890 0.0939
(-0.38) (1.38) (-0.25) (0.37)
N 9392 7911 2069 5259
adj. R2 0.108 0.146 -2.288 0.443
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Table 15: Variance ratio test of peer e ect
The table presents the variance ratio test based on Graham (2008). I use
commercial bank data from CALL report. I define peer banks as banks located
within the same state. I first run the loan loss provision discretion model
each quarter and use the residual as a measure of bank discretionary loan loss
provision. State level between group and within group variance are calculated
using discretionary loan loss provision. SmallState is an indicator variable which
equals to one if the number of banks in a state is smaller than the median each
quarter, and zero otherwise. I use SmallState as an instrument of within state
variance. Dependent variable is between group variance of discretionary loan loss
provision. The estimation is estimated on four sub-samples over time.
(1) (2) (3) (4)








“2 2.1850 .9918 3.3593 5.2856
(3.71)úúú ( 13.21 )úúú (4.60)úúú (7.03)úúú
p-value H0: “2 = 1 0.0442 0.1638 0.0012 0.000
First stage F-statistics 10.071 1.474 12.640 27.971
N 2124 1145 382 973
adj. R2 -1.056 0.990 0.522 0.690
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Table 16: Bank response to non-peer bank actions
I include both peer average idiosyncratic return shock and non-peer average
idiosyncratic return shock as instruments of peer loan loss provision and non-peer
loan loss provisions respectively. Peer definition is based on bank regulator’s
classification. Column (1) include all groups to run the estimation. Column (2)
only use larger banks (group 1 and group 2), while column (3) use the sub-sample
of smaller groups (group 3 and group 4) to estimate the peer e ect. All regressions
include bank and quarter fixed e ects. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering
at bank level.
(1) (2) (3)
All Groups Group 1 and 2 Group 3 and 4
LLPt LLPt LLPt
ave. Peer LLP 0.2967 4.5444 2.1793
(0.14) (1.04) (1.99)úú
ave. nonPeer LLP -4.1112 11.4870 3.4512
(-0.56) (0.60) (1.10)
 NPLt 0.0988 0.1657 0.0628
(5.30)úúú (3.67)úúú (3.65)úúú
 NPLt≠1 0.1643 0.2293 0.1261
(9.71)úúú (6.41)úúú (7.58)úúú
 NPLt≠2 0.1726 0.2302 0.1503
(9.02)úúú (5.48)úúú (8.18)úúú
 Loant -0.0169 -0.0163 -0.0191
(-9.02)úúú (-4.60)úúú (-9.30)úúú
Sizet 0.0005 0.0001 0.0009
(1.70)ú (0.30) (1.75)ú
Ebllpt -0.2780 -0.3024 -0.2852
(-8.34)úúú (-4.82)úúú (-7.25)úúú
C&It 0.0056 0.0074 0.0035
(2.80)úúú (2.93)úúú (1.21)
RealEstatet 0.0026 0.0042 0.0007
(1.56) (1.63) (0.30)
Consumert 0.0031 0.0079 -0.0060
(0.66) (1.41) (-1.53)
T ier1t≠1 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0004
(-5.66)úúú (-2.74)úúú (-5.85)úúú
Peer average characteristics YES YES YES
non-Peer average characteristics YES YES YES
Bank FE YES YES YES
Quarter FE YES YES YES
N 27096 9546 17538
adj. R2 0.399 0.421 0.360
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Appendix
Appendix I: Variable Definitions
Variable Name Description
LLP proportion of loan loss provision (riad4230) as of beginning of
period total loans.
IdioRet Bank level quarterly idiosyncratic return. The return is the
residual from an augmented market model with a equal weighted
bank industry return. The loading is calculated using up to 60
months data.
NPL proportion of non-performing loan (rcfd1403 + rcfd1407) as of
beginning of period total loans (rcfd2122).
 NPL change of non-performing loan, which equals to current quarter
non-performing loan minus last quarter non-performing loan
then divided by beginning of period total loans.
 Loan loan growth rate, which equals to total loans minus lagged total
loans then divided by lagged total loans.
Size logarithm of total assets (rcfd2170)
Loan proportion of total loans (rcfd2122) as of total assets.
Ebllp earnings before loan loss provision (riad4301 + riad4230) divided
by beginning of period total assets.
RealEstate loans secured by real estate (rcfd1410) as of beginning of period
total loans.
C&I commercial and industrial loans (rcfd1600).
Consumer loans to individuals for household, family, and other personal
expenditures (rcfd1975).
Tier1 Tier 1 risk-weighted capital ratio. Missing value of the ratio
before 2001 if replaced with total equity divided by total assets.
Allowance Allowances for loan and leases losses scaled by total loans.
decrease An indicator equals to one if peer banks are decreasing
allowances in the previous quarter.
recession An indicator equals to one if the economy is experiencing
recession according to NBER business cycle date.
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Appendix II: Peer Group Classification used in the Bank Holding Company
Performance Report
Peer Group Number Consolidated Asset Size at the End of the Quarter
01 $10 billion and over
02 $3 billion - $10 billion
03 $1 billion -$3 billion
04 $500 million - $1 billion
05 Less than $500 million (starting March 2006 includes Peer
Group 06)
06 Less than $300 million (valid only prior to March 2006. Starting
March 2003 includes former peer group 07)
07 Less than $150 million (prior to March 2003)
09 Second-tier BHCs and atypical BHCs
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Quarter t t+1t-1
t+40 days t+41 days
FR Y-9C report deadline Bank files are publicly available
t+2
Figure 1: The time line of bank holding company regulatory filing
Source of the filing date information is from Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Bank
Holding Company Data, https://www.chicagofed.org/banking/financial-institution-
reports/bhc-data-faq and Intro to Regulatory Reporting & Reserve Accounts, Federal
Reserve Bank of Richmond https://www.richmondfed.org/banking/education_for_
bankers/introduction_to_regulatory_reporting.
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